THIS IS A TRUE AND COMPLETE COPY OF THE ORIGINAL AS PREPARED BY BILL BATY FROM A PHOTOCOPY
OF THE ORIGINAL FILE.
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS 2D BRIGADE, 1ST INFANTRY DIVISION
APO 96345
AVDE-AMT 8 August 1968
Commanding General
1st Infantry Division
APO 96345
1. (U) OPERATION: TOAN THAIG
2. (U) Inclusive Dates: 050001 May - 062400 May 1968
3. (U) Location: Central LAM SON area.
4. (U) Control Headquarters: Headquarters, 2d Brigade, 1st Infantry Division
5. (U) Reporting Officer: Colonel Herman F. J. Allen, Commanding Officer,
2d Brigade, 1st Infantry Division.
6. (/) TASK ORGANIZATION:
a. Brigades:
1st Battalion, 18th Infantry
2d Battalion, 18th Infantry
2d Battalion, 28th Infantry
1st Battalion, 28th Infantry
1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry
7th Squadron, 1st Air Cavalry
b. 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry
Headquarters & Headquarters Troop, 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry
Troop "A", 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry (-)
Troop "B", 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry (-)
2d Platoon, Company B, 1st Battalion, 18th Infantry
7. SUPPORTING FORCES:
a. Artillery - 1st Battalion, 7th Artillery
b. US Air Force - 7th Air Force
8. (U) INTELLIGENCE:
a. Intelligence during this period indicates Viet Cong movement toward
the Saigon area.
b. During the contact, elements of the 165th Viet Cong Regiment were engaged.
c. Terrain and Weather: Heavily populated area, jungle patches, rice paddies, and
rolling terrain. Tempetures throughout the entire period ranged from moderate
to hot with partly cloudy skies.
d. (/) MISSION: 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry's mission was to conduct reconnaissance
in force operations Northwest of Di An.
9. (/) CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS; The 1-4 Cavalry conducted reconnaissance in force
operations in area northwest of Di An with two troops of Armored Cavalry to
determine if Viet Cong were occuping the area.
10. (/) EXECUTION:
a. 5 May: Dragoon elements continued to operate out of Di An base with the mission
of RIF operations. At 1323 hours, B Troop sighted one Viet Cong, then engaged, two
more jumped up and started to run. Brovo engaged and was credited with 3 VC KIA (BC).
The 7-1 Air Cavalry Apache LFT was called on station. At 1410 hours, Bravo Killed two
more VC. At the same time, Apache received fire from a draw located at coordinates XT
879131. At 1435 hours, A Troop was diverted from their RIF mission and ordered to
move to vicinity of coordinates XT908101 and assume RRF mission. At 1410 hours, Apache
reported spotting two unmanned .50 caliber machineguns. Bravo moved toward the area of
spotting and came under fire. Apache spotted 12 VC in the same area and engaged. At
1500 hours, a B Troop tank was hit by an RPG resulting in 3 WIA. At 1546 hours, B
Troop had two more tanks hit with RPG's resulting in 8 WIA's. One of the tanks was
burning, but all personnel had been evacuated. Between 1625 hours and 1704 hours,
three air strikes were called into the area of contact, vicinity coordinates XT870131.
A Troop was moved into the area of contact as a relief for Bravo and continued with the
attack. At 1728 hours, A Troop CO was wounded by fragments. At 1850 hours, the VC
started moving toward the west in order to break contact. A Troop continued to advance
and engage the retreating VC. A Troop again started to receive heavy fire, on tank was
hit with a RPG. At 1940 hours, A Troop started receiving small arms fire on their right
flank, and returned fire. Contact was broken at approximately 2007 hours and returned
to their base locatioins. Results of the action were 156 VC KIA (BC). Dragoon
casualties, 1 KIA and 16 WIA.
b. 6 May: The squadron continued to conduct operations from base location at Di An. A
Troop with 2/B/1-18 Infantry moved back into the area of the previous days contact.
By 1100 hours, Apache elements had killed 11 VC (BC). A "Psy Ops" operation was
conducted at 1104 hours with negative results. A Troop moved into the contact area
and immediately had 1 VC KIA. At 1230 hours, A Troop reported finding 7 bodies. A
Troop reported killing another VC at 1301 hours. At 1320 hours, A Troop made contact
of their left flank. Alpha was credited with their 3d VC KIA for the day. At 1430
hours, 2/B/1-16 Infantry reported 5 VC KIA and 1 12.7mm machinegun (CHICCM). Apache
got 4 more VC KIA at 1440 hours, at 1500 hours, A-16 reported VC running to his front
and engaged with canister. Gunships were called in. A Troop reported 3 US KIA at
1550 hours. 2/B/1-18 Infantry at 1656 hours had 1 US KIA and 1 minor US WIA. At
1710 hours, A Troop had one more VC KIA. Following this, A Troop made a police of
the battle area and returned to base. At 1859 hours, artillery TOT was brought into
the contact area along with CS gas. Results of the day's action was 184 VC KIA (BC).
US casualties were 2 KIA AND 5 WIA.
c. 18 May: Based on interviews and interrogation of RF/FF and villagers in the area, the
official body count for 5-6 May was changed to 440 VC KIA (BC).
11. (/) RESULTS:
a. Enemy Losses:
(1) Personnel: 440 VC KIA (BC).
(2) Equipment:
12.7mm Machinegun 2 CHICOM commo wire 4500ft.
12.7mm Ammo 900rds M-14 rifle 1
60mm mortar 1 75mm RR 1
AK-47 rifle 15 Bargelore Torpedos 8
AK-47 ammo 2000 rds VC cargo packs 19
AK-47 magazines 32 Shovels 28
Hand Grenades 63 Canteens 13
RPG-7 Launcher 1 Gas masks 3
RPG-7 ammo 20 rds Rice 470 lbs
RPG-2 Launcher 1 Peanuts 64 lbs
RPG-2 ammo 42 rds Doctor's Kit 1
CHICCM field phone 1 Medicene 30 lbs
b. Friendly Losses: 3 US KIA, 21 US WIA
13. (/) ADMISISTRATIVE MATTERS:
a. Resupply was conducted from Di An Base Camp. No emergency resupply was conducted
in the field.
b. Personnel:
Organization Designation Opn Initiated Opn Terminated
Squadron authorized 890 890
Squadron assigned 907 911
Squadron PDY 723 711
Personnel in field 455 479
Personnel in Base Camp 263 232
Hq & Hq, 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry 93 134
Troop A, 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry 100 54
Troop B, 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry 153 22
Troop C, 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry 109 53
14. (/) COMMANDERS ANALYSIS: The VC TET Offensive largely negated the pacification
effort in the 2d Brigade Area of Operations. Rather, all military efforts were redirected
toward the destruction of the VC forces that infiltrated the SAIGON, THU DUC, LAI THIEU,
and CHAU THANH area. The Brigade was able to dominate the area and prevent large troop
movements by following a policy of flexibility, response, and total area coverage. The
Brigade maintained a flexable tactical posture and outlook. For example, when a particular
method or area of operation ceased producing results, a unit was moved to a different area
using another technique of employment. The Brigade responded immediately to all hard
intelligence. Thus preventing the VC from "getting set" for an offensive action. A
combination of the above, prevented the VC from moving large units through the Brigade Area
of Operations during superb. Each contact during this period was executed in an aggressive
and professional manner. The Cavalry demonstrated it's ability to accomplish any mission
assigned, and accomplish them in an exemplary manner.
15. RECOMENDATIONS:
a. Cavalry elements work extremely well in flushing out insurgents in jungle areas
where they have a clear base from which to work. They are able to move through the area
rapidly and destroy anything in their path.
b. Use of the "Block" formation, with all tanks forward crashing jungle, proved most
valuable. The ACAVS followed the tanks, providing security and command. This produced
maximum fire power to the front, the most likely point of contact.
c. It was discovered that all areas capable of concealing large groups of VC must be
continuously screened to prevent VC build-up. This is particularly true of areas where
US or ARVN forces do not normally operate. The area to the south of PHU LOI
(XI908101 - center of mass) is a good example.
FOR THE COMMANDER:
Signed by/
JACK E. ADAMS
Major, Infantry
Adjutant
Note: The symble (/) indicates information that was classified "Confidential" but has since
been declassified. bb