DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS 1ST SQUADRON 4TH CAVALRY
APO San Francisco 96345
AVDB-QH3 13 September 1967
SUBJECT: Combat After Action Report (OPERATION PAUL BUNYAN)
Commanding General
1st Infantry Division
ATTN: ACofS, G-3
APO US Forces 96345
1. REFERENCE: OPORD 10-67 (Operation PAUL BUNYAN)
Hq, 2d Bde, 1st Inf Div, dtd 21 July 1967
2. DATES OF OPERATION: 21 July to 13 August 1967
3. GENERAL: The 1-4 Cav(-) was under the operational control of the 2d Bde
during the entire operation. The 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry's primary mission was
to provide a screen to the north and east of the Ong Dong Jungle which, in effect,
was designed to provide further protection for the Rome Plows clearing the Ong
Dong Jungle.
4. ENEMY ACTIVITIES:
a. Enemy activities throughout the Squadron's area of operations
consisted primarily of RPG2 attacks and the mining of roads. There were no major
enemy encounters during the operation.
On 4 August 1967, while conducting S&D activities Trp B received an RPG-2 round
vicinity XT968285. There were negative casualties and no damage to the vehicle.
On 8 August 1967 Trp A received an RPG-2 round resulting in 4 US WIA and light
damage to one ACAV. VC losses unknown.
Three AT mines were hit during the operation resulting in one M48A3 destroyed
and 2 damaged.
b. Fortifications: Fortifications encountered during the operation
were extremely well constructed.. The majority were constructed with logs and
earth with overhead cover varying from two to three feet in depth.
c. Terrain and Weather: Traffic ability in the Ong Doria Jungle
varied from fair to poor. Frequently, the sandy loam type soil of the Ong Dong
and the rising water table curtailed effective operations, but at no time was the
traffic ability poor enough to warrant the termination of S&D activities.
d. Intelligence: Intelligence prior to the beginning of Operation
PAUL BUNYAN I indicated that prior to the operation the Thu Loi Bn, Autumn Fighters,
C-265 Co., C-63 Co, C-300 plt, C-118 plt, and the Tan Hoa Khanh guerrillas had been
sighted prior to the beginning of the operation in the operational area. Also the
273d Viet Cong Regiment was reportedly located to the northeast of the operational
area.
5. MISSION: 1-4 Cay (-) conducts S&D operations in assigned AOs to screen
operations of Rome Plows against VC activity, secure assigned sector of Route
Bronze, escort convoys to Lai Khe, secure FSPB "C" and secure engineer work parties
on Route 13.
6. EXECUTION: Initially the Squadron (-) with A/5/2 conducted security
operations along Route Bronze and escorted convoys between Di An and Lei Khe while
Troops A & B secured FSPB "C" (XT908170) and FSPB "F" (ST0217). The portion of
Route Bronze from CP 84 to CP 83 was secured in conjunction with 1st Cav ARVN.
Initial Squadron CP was located vicinity XT955250. In the course of the removal of
the Ong Dong Jungle the Squadron (-) conducted screening operations and Search and
Destroy to the northeast. As the Rome Plows advanced, the Squadron (-) area of
operation was steadly moved to the north until such a time that it straddled Route
16 vicinity XT9129. At this time Troop C assumed responsibility for FSPB "F" and
Troop B rejoined the Squadron. The remaining time was spent operating east of Route
16 north of the Ong Dong Jungle conducting screening and Search and Destroy
missions. Results of this mission are as listed in paragraph 8.
7. SUPPORT: Artillery units of the 1st Infantry Division Artillery provided
artillery preparations and fire support on call. The 7th Air Force provided TAO Air
support. Prep and airstrikes were call and preplanned.
8. RESULTS:
a. US Losses:
(1) Personnel - 12 WIA
(2) Equipment - 2 M48A3 Damaged by mines
1 M113 Damaged by RPG-2
1 M48A3 Destroyed by mine.
b. VC Losses:
(1) Personnel - Unknown
(2) Equipment - 3000 lbs polished rice
6 AT mines
11 Base camps
7 Shelters with tin roofs
79 Bunkers with overhead cover
1 750 lb bomb
3 Rifle Grenades 14 Booby traps
1 US Claymoro mine
1 Stove
9 VC ponchos
1 Chicom Claymore mine Numerous documents
39 Firing positions
6 Mortar positions
130 rounds AK-47 ammo
2 US carbines
7 RPG-2 rounds
5 EPG-2 charges
1 RPG-2 launcher
300 .30 cal rounds
9. ADMINISTRATION MATTERS:
a. Administrative and Logistical support was adequate
(1) Supply: Initial resupply was by road, with Phu Loi as
the logistical base. Later, resupply was limited to air transportation.
(2) Maintenance: All maintenance was adequate and support
was fell coordinated.
(3) Treatment of Casualties: No unusual treatment problems
(4) Communications: Constant effective communications were
maintained at all times.
b. Personnel analysis:
Organization Designator Initial Termination
1-4 Cav: Authorized 930 930
Assigned a. 566 b. 566
Above figures exclude Troop D(Air) and one troop; Troop
B (figure a) & Troop C (Figure b.) OPCON 1st Brigade
Present for Duty a. 542 b. 538
Figure A excludes Troop B and Troop D (Air)
Figure B excludes Troop C and Troop D (Air)
c: Combat After Action Report (OPERATION PAUL BUNYAN)
Present in Field: a. 321 b. 334
Figure A excludes Troop B and D (Air)
Figure B excludes Troop C and D (Air)
Present Base Camp:
Troop A 18 19
Troop B detached 18
Troop C 19 detached
Troop D (Air) detached
Headquarters Troop 193 171
FOR THE COMMANDER:
/signed by
JOHN W. HOLDSWORTH
CPT, Armor
Adjutant