HEADQUARTERS
HEADQUARTERS, 1ST SQUADRON, 4TH CAVALRY
APO San Francisco 96345
AVDB-QH3 19 June 1967
OP BLUEFIELD AFTER ACTION REPORT
1. REFERENCE: OPORD 6-67 (OP BLUEFIELD) Hq 3d Bde
2. DATES: From 1 June to 9 June 1967
3. GENERAL: The 1-4 Cav under operational control of 3d Bde conducted S&D
operations in AO Dragoon N/W of Ben Cat.
a. Reporting Officer: LTC John W. Seigle
(Assumed command of 1-4 Cav on 2 June 1967)
b. Task Organization:
Hq Trp CPT George S. Moffitt
Trp A CPT Charles B. Fegan
Trp B (detached to 2d Bde) CPT James A.. Skillings
Trp C CPT William G. Yarborough
Trp D (Air) Major Robert E. Oberg
(opcon of Div and/or Brigades throughout the operation)
2d Plt A/5-2 Arty Lt Jimmy R. Hines
4. ENEMY ACTIVITIES:
a. General: During Operation Bluefield friendly elements engaged no
enemy units. There were no confirmed sightings of Viet Cong personnel.
On 4 June 1967, the command and control helicopter was fired upon vic XT846414.
There were no hits or casualties.
There was one attack on the Squadron perimeter with M79 or rifle grenades. Only
two or three rounds were received and there were no casualties.
Thirteen base camps which contained 106 bunkers were found in the Squadron area
of operations. Some base camps had been recently used. The most significant
findings were a regimental sized base camp found vic XT673451 and 300 meters of
standing-room sized tunnel found vic XT871468. The regimental size base camp
contained 90 bunkers, trenches and a small tunnel system. The tunnel system was
approximately 6 months old and had never been completed. There were no
indications that the tunnel had ever been used or lived in.
b. Fortifications: Fortifications encountered during the operation
consisted of bunkers made of logs and earth, and foxholes, some with overhead cover.
c. Terrin and weather: The terrain in the area of operations was a
sandy loom type soil and was in fair condition for movement of armored vehicles.
The area was primarily jungle of single canopy with dense undergrowth and rubber
trees. The roads through the rubber were approximately 20' wide and in good
condition. The roads were not used because there was a high probability of mines.
The weather during the period of the operation was partly cloudy to cloudy with
2 heavy rainshowers which had no signigficant effect on movement by the maneuver.
5. MISSION: 1-4 Cav conducted S&D operation in AO Dragoon with priority to
areas, E, F, and G.
6. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS:
a. Concept of Operation:
(1) Maneuver: 1-4 Cav (-) conducts S&D operations in areas E,
F, and G in three phases. Phase 1 - Trps A and C move on assigned routes, cross
ID abreast commencing 050900 June, conduct S&D operations in area E. Phase 2 -
On order, Trps A and C conduct S&D in area F. Phase 3 - On order, 1-4 Cav (-)
conducts S&D in area G. (ANNEX A Overlay).
(2) Fire Support: Preplanned concentrations will be fired
commencing at 050730 June. Supporting fires provided from Lai Khe, Phuoc Vinh
and FSB 33 (XT781450) (Annex C, Fire support Plan).
b. Troop A:
(1) Move to LD on Route Saddle, cross SP at 050830 June.
(2) Conduct S&D operations in assigned zone of area E.
(3) Return to and occupy assigned defensive position in UDP STUD prior to EENT.
(4) Be prepared to continue S&D in area E on succeeding days.
(5) On order, execute Phases 2 and 3.
c. Troop C:
(1) Move to LD on Route Bugle, crsss SP at 060800 June.
(2) - (5) Same as Troop A
d. 2Plt, A/5-2 Arty:
(1) Protect Hqs group during. movement.
(2) Organize defense of inner Hqs group in NDP STUD.
(3) Be prepared on order to detach Hqs ACAV's and reinforce
either Trp A or C.
7. EXECUTION:
a. 1 June 67: 1-4 Cav moved from Phu Loi to field location at
XT861307 released from opcon 1st Bde and placed under operational control of
3d Bde upon closing field location.
b. 2-8 June 67: 1-4 Cav (-) conducted S&D operations in AO
Dragoon east of Bau Bang. No enemy contact was made during the entire operation.
The most significant accomplishment of the operation was the location and
destruction of enemy base camps and the capture and/or destruction of VC weapons
and equipment shown in Para. 9.
c. 3 June Squadron CP moved to XT856442.
d. 4 June 67: Squadron CO's command helicopter received fire from
XT846414. Trp C was deployed approximately 900 meters N/W of contact location.
Artillery and airstrikes were placed on target. A search of the area after
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f. Areas E and F were thoroughly searched during the course of the
operation. However, only the extreme southern fringe of Area G was searched.
8. SUPPORT: Artillery units of the 1st Infantry Division artillery provided
artillery preparations and fire support on call. 7th Air Force provided TAC air
support. Prop and strikes were on call and pre-planned.
9. RESULTS:
a. Enemy Losses: Base camps
Base Camps 13 (1 possible medical station)
Bunkers 106
Foxholes 127
Huts 21
Trench 425 meters
Tunnels 350 meters
Vegetable garden 1
Weapons 4 shotguns and 8 rifles
Grenades 22
.50 cal MG ammo 52 rounds
SA Arms 367 rounds
Gunpowder 1/2 lb
M79 (40mm) ammo 11 rounds (possible 15)
LAW 2
Electric wire 100 meters
Documents 2
Sleeping bags 2
Bicycles 3
Misc med supplies
M14 protective mask 2
1/8" steel reinforcing rods 1000 lbs
civilian type portable radio 1
Miscellanious clothing
Bamboo type electrical mine detonator
b. US Losses:
Personnel - 1 KIA
1 WIA
Equipment - 1 M42 (Damaged)
10. ADMINISTRATION MATTERS:
a. Administrative and Logistical Support was adequate.
(1) Supply: Support of Class I, III and V was carried
as basic load. Resupply was by air. Resupply was based from Phu Loi, with
supplies being transported from Di An. A total of 281 tons were transported
by air. 42 tons were moved by road to transport point in Phu Loi for air
transport. A total of 66 tons of Class III was moved by air and consumed
during this operation.
(2) Maintenance: All maintenance was performed at field
location. A total of 30.9 tons in parts were moved by air.
b. Personnel analysis:
ORGANIZATION DESIGNATOR INITIAL TERMINATION
1-4 Cav: Authorized 930 930
Assigned 591 567
Above figure reflects squadron strength less Troop
B and. Troop D (Air) which wore dettached.
Present for Duty 537 519
Figures exclude Troop B and. Troop D (Air)
Present in field A 32 21
B 415 413
Figure (A) includes Troops A, C, and Hq
Figure (B) includes Troops A, C, and Hq Plus 1 plt from A Battery 5-2 Artillery
which was attached.
Present Base Camp A 32 21
B Detached
C 28 34
HHT 109 98
D (Air) Detached
11. SPECIAL EQUIPMENT AND TECHNIQUES: None
12. CONCLUSIONS AND LESSONS LEARNED:
13. a. Conclusions:
(1) Viet Cong base camps in AC Dragoon were almost always located
within 100 - 150 meters of an open area (valley, clearing, or trail) and in densly
forested areas. This pattern reflects most earlier experience with base camp
locations. Although the VC cannot necessarily be expected to continue the practice
of sitting base camps in a predictable pattern, experience does at least allow the
search and destroy force to concentrate its efforts in the areas most likelv to
contain base camps.
(2) The Infantry Division Cavalry Squadron configured (as is the
1st Squadron 4th Cavalry) without organic infantry squads still offers some
advantages as a search and destroy force - - even in heavily - jungled areas.
Although it lacks the personnel for a thorough foot search of extensive areas it
has the capability to move comparatively quickly from one area to another and to
search thoroughly within limited areas on the ground. This movement - dismounted
search tradeoff should be taken into account in determining squadron missions.
b. Lesson Learned:
(1) Whenever possible, an area to be searched by dismounted
troopers should first be reconnoitered by fire using 90mm canister. Artillery and
air strikes will destroy many booby traps, but not all of them. Selective canister
fires reduce the likelihood of encountering Viet Cong booby traps.
(2). Continuous, unremitting "jungle crashing" takes a heavy toll
in mechanized equipment. It literally tears apart tracked vehicle suspension
systems and strains transmissions beyond endurance. It is neither necessary nor
desirable to search a forested area completely by "jungle crashing." Some vehicular
penetration is necessary, but the extent of penetration desireable should be
determined in light of several other factors. In no sense should the "track
pattern" observable from the air become the guide to the thoroughness with which
an area has been searched:
(a) Known and suspected base camp locations - - based on common sitting
practices as well as available intelligence.
(b) Areas of jungle partially "opened up" by artillery preparations and
air strikes. Air strikes using 500 pound or larger bombs are well invested in
opening up suspected locations.
(c ) Through ground search of selected areas with tanks providing prior
reconnaissance by fire with canister and all tracked vehicles then in an overwatch
role. Only by searching on the ground can one fine - - other than as the product
of blind luck - - well-concealed Viet Cong positions and caches. Armored vehicles
sometimes provide the best means of reaching an area to be searched on the ground;
they do not provide a suitable means for the detailed search itself.
/signed by
JOHN W. SEIGLE
LTC, Armor
Commanding