HEADQUARTERS
1st Squadron 4th Cavalry
APO SF 96345
28 May 1967
SUBJECT: Combat After Action Report (OP MANHATTAN)
Comnanding General
1st Inf Div
ATTN: ACofS, G3
APO 96345
1. OPORD 06-67 (OP MANHATTAN) Hq 11th ACR, dtd 19 Apr 67.
2. Dates: 20 Apr through 11 May 67.
3. General: The 1/4 Cav under the operational control of the 11th ACR,
escorted artillery and engineer units from Lai Khe to Ben Cui. During the
operation, the 1/4 Cav secured FSB 0, 11th ACR CP, cleared and outposted
route from FSB 0 to 11th ACR daily; secured Engineer working parties and
conducted S&D operations in designaited AO's.
a. Reporting Officer: LTC Thomas W. Fife.
b. Task Org:
Hq Trp CPT George S. Moffitt
Trp A CPT Rodney W. Symons
Trp C CPT Glen Yarborough
Co B/2/2 Inf (Mech) CPT John R. Gallagher,Jr.
4. Enemy Activities: Enemy activities throughout the Squadron's area of
operations consisted primarily of the mining of roads. There were 2 attacks
with RPG-2 and. Anti-tank grenades, both of which failed.
There were 3 incidents in which the Squadron Commander's Command and Control
helicopter received ground fire. There were hits on the aircraft in 2 incidents.
On 29 April 1967, Troop C, with 1 platoon of 919 Engineer Company attached,
engaged local. administration elements of the VC Binh Duong Province vic XT558547.
VC losses as a result of the action were: 12 VC KIA (BC), 8 VC (POW), 2 VC WIA
(POW); I US AR 15, 1 US Ml carbine, 1 US pistol cal .45, 1 Chicom Type 53 carbine,
1 Chicom SMG, Type 50. There were 26 detainees classified as draft dodgers and
were evacuated by or to RVN National Police.
5. Mission:
(1) Escort artillery and engineer convoy from Lai Khe to forward
assembly area vicinity Ben Cui on 20-21 April
(2) Escort convoy containing 11th AC Regiment CP and Squadron trains
from Lai Khe to CP/Trains location vicinity Dau Tieng on 21-22 April. Provide
security for 11th AC Regiment CP/Trains area.
(3) Seize end secure 11th AC Regiment CP/Trains area by 220800
hours for arrival of advance party by helicopter.
(4) Provide security for engineer work parties preparing FSB 0
and working in AO OSCAR beginning on 21 April.
(5) Secure location from Dau Tieng FSA to FSB 0.
(6) Attach 3 tanks to engineer work parties (clearing teams)
on 21 April.
(7) Be prepared to conduct S&D in AO OSCAR.
6. Concept of operations: 1/4 Cavalry with two cavalry troops, one Infantry
Company (Mechanized) and one platoon of AWSP under operational control escort
artillery Engineers and 11th ACR to vicinity Dau Tieng, and provide security
and conduct S&D operations as require by OPORD 09-67 (OP MANHATTAN Hq 11th ACR
dtd 19 April 67 and subsequent frag orders.
7. Execution:
a. 20 April: 1st Squadron 4th Cavalry with one Cavalry Troop and
one Infantry Company (Mechanized) escorted Artillery, Engineers and a team of
C/7O1st to Ben Cui.
b. 21 April: 1 /4 (-) arrived to Ben Cui with escorted units. Troop
A escorted 11th ACR CP and trains from Bien Hoa to field location vicinity Dau
Tieng. No enemy contact was made during the march and all elements closed into
their field locations without incident.
c. 22 April to 10 May 67: 1/4 Cavalry conducted road sweeping and
route security; security of Engineer work sites; convoy escort; perimeter security
and limited S&D operations in AO.
d. 10 April B/2/2 escorted convoys to Lai Khe and Di An. Released
opcon 1/4 Cavalry.
e. 11 April: 1/4 Cav moved from FSB 0 to Phu Loi and escorted Artillery
and Engineer units to Di An and Phu Loi. Closed Phu Loi 1835 hours without enemy
contact or incidents.
8. Support: Artillery units of the 1st Infantry Division Artillery provided
artillery preparations and fire support on call. 7th Air Force provided TAC air
support Prep and strikes were on call and pre-planned.
9. Results: US Losses
Personnel - 4 WIA
Equipment - 1 M42 Damaged by mine
2 M48A3 Damaged by mine
1 M113 Damaged by mine
VC Losses
Personnel - 12 VC KIA (BC)
2 VC WIA (BC) (POW)
26 VCS
8 VC (Pow)
1 Chieu Hoi
Equipment - 1 Booby Trap
50 Pungi Pits
18 AT mines
9 Bicycles
5 Uniforms
3 Huts destroyed
120 Rounds Chicom 7.62
2 US Helmuts
1 Machete
4 tunnels
69 Bunkers
12 Butterfly bombs
2 8" Artillery rounds
1 Pair black pajamas
1 Tool bag
7 AP mines
8 Base camps
3 4.2 mortar rounds
1 Shape charge
7 Weapons
1 ox-cart
14 Rounds cal .45
3 Rounds RPG-2
6 VC villages
6 Foxholes
1 Gas mask
10. Administration Matters:
a. Administrative and Logistical support was adequate.
(1) Supply: Support of class I, III and V was carried by
Troops as basic load. Initially resupply was by air. Later establishment of
the Forward Supply Point at Dau Tieng enabled resupply to be handled
effectively by truck. Resupply by air was only used for mail and critically
needed parts.
(2) Maintenance: All maintenance during Operation Manhattan
was adequate and support was well coordinated.
(3) Treatment of Casualties: No unusual treatment problems
occured. There was an increase in the usual number of MEDCAP missions during this
operation Because of the difficulty in obtaining MEDCAP type supplies, an advance
notification of four to five weeks is needed.
(4) Communication: Constant effective communications were
maintained at all times. As a supplemental means, direct line communications
were available. The direct support was exceptional and no communications
equipment had more than one day down time.
b. Personnel analysis:
ORGANIZATION DESIGNATOR INITIAL TERMINATION
1/4 Cav: Authorized 930 930
Assigned 592 613
Above figure includes Troops A, C and HQ. Troops Band D (air) were detached
during this period.
Present for duty 513 539
Figures do not include Troops B and D (Air) who
were detached during this Operation
Present in the Field a. 421 441
b. 579 610
Figures (a) represent total for Troops A,C, and HQ. Figures (B) includes B Co.
2 Bn, 2 Inf which was OPCON during the Operation
Present Base Camp: HQ Trp 65 64
A Trp 13 22
C Trp 14 12
Troops B and D (Air) detached.
11. Special Eqipment and Techniques: None
12. Conclusions and Lessons Learned:
a. Conclusions: Omitted
b. Lessons Learned: Ommitted
FOR THE COMMANDER
/signed by/
ALFRED E. HUNTER
CW4, USA
Asst Adjutant