HEADQUARTERS
1st SQUADRON 4TH CAVALRY
APO 96345
5 February 1967
SUBJECT: Combat After Action Report (CEDAR FALLS)
TO: Commanding Officer
3d bde, lst lnf Div
Attn: S-3
APO 96345
1. (C) OPOPD 2-67 (CEDAR FALLS) Hq, 1/4 Cay, dtd 6 Jan 1967, 1/4
Cav (-) opcon 173d Abn Bde from 9 to 25 Jan 67. Opcon 3d Bde from 250700
to 2615OO Jan 67.
2. (U) Dates: 9 Jan 67 through 28 Jan 1967.
3. (C) General: 1/4 Cay (-) conducted. road c1earing operations, convoy
escort and security operations, made reconnaissances in force and occupied
blocking positions, as directed in Oplan 2-67 (OP CEDAR FALLS)
173d Abn Bde and, subsequent Frag Orders.
a. Reporting Officer: LTC Thomas W. File.
b. Task Org:
Hq Trp - Cpt Dudley M. Andrea
Trp A - Cpt Rodney N. Symons; detached, attached to 1st Bde on 17 Jan
Trp B - Cpt Harold W. Wilkins.
Trp C - Cpt Jack Dice.
Trp D (air) - Maj Robert Oborg frequently opcon to Div-Bde's
throughout the operation.
A/5/2 Arty {AWSP) - Cpt John F. Gulla..
C/5/2 Arty (AWSP) Cpt Richard C. Steinbacher detached, on 23 Jan 67.
C/2/2 Inf (Mech) Cpt Donald G Mitchell, attached on 24 Jan 67.
B/2/28 Inf - Cpt John A Turner, attached on 25 Jan 67.
c. Squadron command group consisted or LTC Thomas W. Fife squadron
Commander, Maj Vernon E Ebert squadron executive officer; Maj David D Gilpatrick
squadron, S-3 (wounded and evacuated on 23 Jon 67); Cpt Ronald Copes squadron
S-2; Cpt Samuel D Wilder squadron S-l; Cpt David Kelley squadron S-4; Cpt
George Moffitt squadron comnunications officer, and Cpt James Ski11ings
Squadron Maintenance officer.
4. (C) Inte11igence:
a. Enemy situation: Avai1able information prior to commencement of
OP CEDAR FALLS indicated the presence of the Hqs VC Military region IV in the
Iron Triangle. Local guerillas were in the area for the defense of this
headquarters but all main force units have withdravm. The existance of several
very sophisticated tunnel and bunker comp1exs was also reported.
b. Terrian and Weather
(1. Terrain. The area of operations can be characterized as
generally flat with two main rivers on either side. Wooded areas run from thick
scrub brush to heavy dense jungle. Secondary roads are trafficable but Cross
country mobility was from average to good through the jungle areas. Rice paddies
were still too wet to be traversed.
(2. Weather. Characterized by hot humid days. Rain was at
a minimum during this period. Evenings and early mornings were exceptionally cool.
5. (C) Mission: 1/4 Cav (-) completed all missions assigned. Missions consisted
of Road and Security; S&D operations; recon in force; security of Engr work parties;
blocking and screening.
6. (C) Concept of Operations: Initally with three trps on line, blocking psns were
occupied east of the Thi Thinh River. Subsequant opns, north of and within the
Triangle, consisted of each manouver element being assisgned an AO up to 10 km
wherein S&D and security missions were carried out. Primary purpose of these
operations was to locate and destroy the Hqs of VC Military Region IV; disrupt local
VC infra structure; and secure work parties clearing extensive areas across the Iron
Triangle.
7. (C) Execution:
a. 9-10 Jan 67: Three manouver elements on line occupied blocking psns
on east bank of Thi Think River while conducting S&D opns in zone between Hwy 13 and
the river. Enemy contact resulted in: VC Losses: 2 KIA. US Losses: 1 M113
destroyed, 1 KIA and 5 WIA.
b. 10-22 Jan 67: Moved into area immediately north of the Iron Triangle
to conduct S&D and recon in force operations. Provided a screen along the northeast
of the operational area. Trp A detached 17 Jan 67 for operations with the 1st Bde.
There was light enemy contact throughout operational area in the form of an
occasional sniper and attempts to employ claymores against night perimeters. An
increase in mining incidents resulted in the order being given to stay off all
secondary roads. VC killed and captured are noted below. Friendly casualties were
light.
c. 22-28 Jan 67: Only remaining unit operating in the Triangle area.
Conducted S&D operations in addition to securing engineer exploitation of tunnels.
During this phase of the Operation VCC and Chicu Hoi's were high. Viet Cong hiding
in the tunnels were driven by Hunger to surrender. The biggest find was the capture,
by A/5/2, of the G-1/G-2 of MR IV with his report to Hanoi, reference success of MR
IV in 1966.
8. (C) Support: Artillery units of the 1st Inf Div, 173d Abn Bde, and 11th ACR
provided support. 7th AF provided tactical air support. Preperations and stricks
were both on call and preplanned.
9. Results:
a. US Casualties: 2 KIA, 35 WIA
b. US Equipment destroyed: 1 VTR, 1 Tank, 3 APC's, 1 1-1/2
c. VC Casualties: 37 KIA, (BC) 65 VCs, 36 chiau Hoi's, 26 Detained,
82 tons of rice, 100 bunkers destroyed, 9 batches of documents captured, 10
individual weapons captured and 17 sampans destroyed.
10. (C) Admin and Log Matters.
a. Admin and logistical plans were adequate.
(1. Classes I, II and V were carried by Troops as basic load.
Initially resupply was from Phu Loi by truck, then later from Lai Khe by air and
by truck.
(2. Maintenance: Maintenance of vehicles was excellant since
repair parts were rapidily available on a consolidated PIE vehicle located in the
CP area. This was the first occasion of this type of re-supply which proved to be
very effective. The overall maintenance posture was excellant.
(3. Treatment of Casualties: The squadron aid station was
established at the forward command post. Routine sick call was handled at this
point. When convenient or necessary, battle casualties were treated and screened
there also. In most instances, however, the squadron surgeon was flown to the
point of injury in the field to supervise treatment prior to arrival of evacuation
helicopters.
(4. Transportation: Re-supply by LLOC permitted rapid resupply
of PLL and other needed items. LLOC proved to be more responsive than an ALOC.
(5. Communications: Excellent radio communications were
maintained during OP CEDAR FALLS. Contact was maintained with Phu Loi base station
throughout the entire operation.
(6. Medical Evacuation: Evacuation was prompt in every case that rapid
transportation was needed. Response from Dust-Off was excellant at night as well
as during daylight hours. On occasion, orgainic aircraft were utilized for
evacuation when they were in the immediate vicinity of the injury and could be
diverted for this use. On two occasions med-evac personnel carriers were used to
transport lightly wounded to the squadron aid station.
b. Personnel analysis:
ORGAINIZATION DESIGNATOR INITIAL TERMINATION
1/4 Cav: Authorized................... 1019 1019
Assigned.........................1057 1029
PDY..............................1021 934
PIF...............................653 613
PBC Hq Trp: ......................107 112
Trp A:..........................8 9
Trp B: ........................24 10
Trp C: .........................3 5
Trp D: .......................204 184
(1. The only personnel problem was a continuing shortage of
ACAV crew members. Five personnel are required on each vehicle in order to fully
fight the vehicle and to provide sufficient personnel for dismounted activities.
11. Special Equipment and techniques: None
12. Conclusions and Lessons Learned:
a. Searching in areas wherein the VC have maintained extensive underground
installations should be prolonged over several weeks. The enemy underground
is forced into the open as his food supply is depleted and his morale is weakened.
Continious mounted patrolling over such areas allows daily coverage of extinsive
Areas and will increase the likelihood of capturing or inducing the surrender of a
Hungry and demoralized enemy.
b. Secondary roads especially are apt to be heavily mined within VC
dominated areas. AT mines are often employed in pairs within 100 meters of one
another. Freshly made vehicle trails are subject to being mined shortly after
passage of a friendly element; hence a new trail should never be used again
without sweeping for mines and searching for command detonated wires. Culverts
and trenches beneath a roadway are prime loactions for large antitank mines in
this respect a bunker or foxhole next to a roadway should always be suspected
as an entrance to a mined tunnel beneath the road. On one occasion a shred of
tin foil was found buried at a depth of several inches, probably to confuse the
mine sweeping teams. At a greater depth in the same spot an anti-tank mine was
discovered.
/signed by
THOMAS W. FIFE
LTC, Armor
Commanding